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               Even If Conditionals: 
       Even and its Relationship to the  Consequent* 
                                Eiichi Yamasaki 
1. Introduction 
   As illustrated in 1 and  2, even if conditionals appear  to entail their 
consequents. The latter appear INDEPENDENT of the corresponding ante-
cedents in the sense that their truth is asserted regardless of the truth 
of their antecedents.1) Let us call this phenomenon C(onsequent-) 
I (ndependence). 
   (1) Even if it rains, the game will continue. 
   (2) Even if the bridge were standing I would not cross. 
                                     (Benett1982)
This phenomenon is visible regardless of the choice of moods. Test 
examples which illstrate the apparent entailment of corisequents are 
given in 3 and 4, where a contradiction is felt. 
   (3) #Even if it rains, the game will continue, but (I think it won't 
        rain, so) the game won't continue. 
   (4) #Even if the bridge were standing, I would not cross, but 
       (I think the bridge isn't standing, so) I  will cross. 
One approach to the above phenomenon amounts to claiming that con-
ditionals with even and those without even are subject to different ruth-
conditions.2) A corollary of this assumption is that even alters truth-con-
ditions in conditionals, even though it leaves them unchanged elsewhere. 
Assumptions along these basic lines pervade much of the research on 
even if. 
   In contrast, we will propose that all conditionals be given a simple 
and traditional material-implication-based nalysis and that even be 
uniformly treated as imposing constraints on its context, not on truth-
conditions per se. 
                         116
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 Notice, crucially, that CI is not always observed: 
(5) My employer isso puritanical that he would fire me if I behaved 
    in what he considered a libertine manner. Even if my wife 
    smoked cigarettes, he would fire me  (,  but, since she wouldn't 
    ever smoke, he won't fire me).
   (6) Even if you drink just a little, your boss will fire you (, but, 
       since you surely won't  drink (at all), he won't fire you). 
Any approach which seeks to ensure the effect of CI in even if construc-
tions by positing adistinct set of truth-conditions is devastatingly counter-
exemplified by 5 and 6, where CI is absent despite the presence of even. 
The analysis proposed here will rise above these difficulties. 
2. Framework: Relevance Theory 
   This study follows Relevance Theory, advocated by Sperber & Wilson 
1986. An important perspective is that the information from the inputs 
of utterances and other cognitive perceptions i processed in connection 
with contextual assumptions through logical operations in the processing 
field, called central systems, which can be thought of as where a human 
being thinks, reasons and deduces. This theory  also claims that such 
processes are subject o the Principle of Relevance, which expresses an 
aspect of human nature in which people can and indeed do process in-
coming assumptions in such a way that they extract  sufficient. relevance. 
That is, they try to get more cognitive ffect and use less effort. 
   In this  framework,'  'context' is not a vague theoretical concept at 
all; a context is some bunch of assumptions which the Speaker (S) and 
the Hearer (H) each have or get  in, their central systems. Thus, both the 
assumptions which constitute a context  and those which are from ut-
terances are semantic nformation in the same format. In order to draw 
out more relevance, such a context can be extended or changed under the 
Principle of Relevance using accessible assumptions in the memory or 
 in-corning assumptions acquired through perceptions. 
   Our claim below is that such an elaboration of the initial context 
is  stipulated. by even. That is, we claim  even works as a constraint on its
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context and through this it contributes to the processing of the utterance 
in which it  appears.3)
3. Even: a constraint on its context 
   In this section we provide a unified account of even's role in con-
straining context. To begin with, we take seriously the general idea that 
even does not contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance inwhich 
it appears. That is, the truth-conditions of 7 and 8 are the same with or 
without even. 
   (7) (Even) Harry got lost. 
   (8) Mary will leave (even) if you stay. 
Further, if 9 and 10, which are felt to be implied by the even forms in 
7 and 8 respectively, are false, they do not affect he truth-values of the 
utterances in  question  4)
   (9) Somebodyelse got lost. 
   (10) In some case other than the one where you stay, Mary will 
        leave. 
Moreover, the negative operators in 11 and 12 cannot negate vens. 
   (11) It is not the case that (even) Harry got lost. 
   (12) It is not the case that Mary will leave (even) if you stay. 
In 11 and 12, the negations negate, respectively, the  information that 
Harry lost his way and the information that Mary  will leave on condi-
tion that H will  stay.5) However,  they do not  negate impressions, i. e. 
9 and 10. Thus, even is not a part of the truth-conditional content of 
the utterance. 
   Given the above conclusion, our claim is that the normal function 
of even is to restrict he context  against which the utterance isprocessed. 
That is, even is a marker which requires a certain assumption i its con-
text. 
   What is that assumption required by  even,, then? Considering 9 and 
10, we can generalize the assumptions required in the relevant contexts. 
The assumption  will be a conjunction: one conjunct will be the prop-
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osition within even's scope with an unbound variable replacing the 
focus of even; the other conjunct will assert he non-equality of the 
unbound variable and the focus of even. Given that even's cope is its 
clause and its focus is the part even modifies, we get 13 and 14. 
  (13) (7) Focus: the subject  / Scope: the entireclause 
 x  got  lost  A  x*  Harry 
  (14) (8) Focus: the antecedent 
             Scope:  theentire clause (i. e. the conditional itself) 
             If x, Mary will leave A x  # you stay 
Therefore,  `x got lost A x* Harry' and  If x, Mary will leave A  x' 
you stay' are the contextual information required by even. Since, gener-
ally, information which has an unassigned variable does not yield suf-
ficient relevance, because it is not a proposition, the variable undergoes 
possible value-assignment (PVA). This assignment is performed under 
the Principle of Relevance by identifying  'x' as some preceding assump-
tion in the context or, if there is not a good candidate already, by re-
trieving some piece of knowledge from memory and constructing some 
usual condition under which the original consequent holds true. 
   To surmarize, in interpreting an even if conditional(even  +  `p  -+ q'), 
H processes its propositional form  (`  p q') against a context which 
includes  `x  -+ q A  x* p' due to the effect of even. 
4. CI and  logical  operations 
   Now, let us put our ideas together. We have decomposed even if 
conditionals into two elements; the general meaning of conditionals and 
the normal operation of even on the interpretation proces. And, since 
CI does not characterize a material implication, CI is consequently not 
essential to even if conditionals, which contain material implications. 
Thus, an independent case must be just a consequence of logical inter-
actions of a material implication with other assumptions in a context. 
Some sample logical deductions which give rise to the effect of CI are 
seen below.
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   (15)  p  —>  q,  -p—'q  / q 
  (16)  q,  p  —>  q  /  q 
   15 expresses that when we have two material implications whose 
antecedents are contradictory and whose consequents are the same, 
we can deduce the  inforMation corresponding to the consequents. 
   16 corresponds to the case where the assumption corresponding to
the consequent of the material implication isalready given or is summoned 
from memory as a piece of knowledge of the world. Since the consequent 
is true for such an independent reason, it is true. 17 can be thought of 
as an example of this. 
   (17) Even if that finger were bent, Syracuse would be in central 
    New York. (Bennett1982) 
Although 16 explains ome cases of independent  consequents, we will 
not pursue this line any further, because this kind of reasoning has nothing 
to do with the even if conditionals per se. 
   These are not the only logical operations that give rise to  CI-effects. 
Indeed, not all cases of CI arise from tautologies of propositional logic: 
supporting knowledge about particular relations or individuals mentioned 
in a conditional may give rise to equally valid  CI-inducing entailments. 
 5. The application of the theory to the examples 
   Now we can apply our theory to the examples in sec. 1. Since 2 is 
analyzed practically in the same way, we just reconsider 1  as an  'inde-
pendent' case, which is repeated with analysis in 18. 
   (18) Even if it rains, the game will continue. 
           propositional form: p  -> q
           constraint imposed by even: x  -> q A p PVA: 
 -p  q  (19) 
 p  ->  -p-+q/q 
   (19)  If  it does notrain, the game will continue. 
An even if conditional consists of  'p q' and  even. In processing, even 
requires  'x  -> q A  x p' as a constraint on the context. In assigning a
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value to  'x', as in this example no particular assumption serves as the 
value already given, some knowledge is retrieved from H's memory. 
Here, it is  ` -p' that stands in for  'x' which is easy enough to retrieve. 
That is, the knowledge which we aquire through our lives tells us that 
games continue on condition that it does not rain. Thus, this  `-p  -> q', 
which  is expressed as 19, makes a small enough demand on processing 
energy to satisfy the Principle of Relevance. The pattern here satisfies 
15 and, thus, we can deduce  'q'. Therefore, this example allows us 
to predict CI, and in fact we get it. 
   Next consider  'dependent' examples. We begin with example 5, 
whose essential part is repeated as 20, assuming the same preceding con-
text as in 5. 
   (20) Even if my wife smoked cigarettes, he would fire me. 
           propositional form: p  -> q 
           constraint imposed by even: x  -> q A p PVA: 
 r->q(21) 
 p  q,  r  ->  q 
The propositional form is, again,  `p  -> q', and even's requirement is just 
as in 18. The result of PVA, however, is different from that in 18. In 
this case, through preceding contextual assumptions, the expected  re-
sult will be something like 21 and not 22. 
   (21) If I smoked cigarettes, he would fire me.6) 
   (22) If my wife didn't smoke cigarettes,he would fire me. 
The information in 22 would be difficult to retrieve from H's memory, 
because it is such a rare experience in life. Thus, the assumption i 22 
is much less accessible than that in 21, so it is too energy-consuming to 
satisfy the Principle of Relevance. As a result, as H fails to get  `-p q', 
he can not use 15. In fact, there is no logically valid inference that could 
derive the information corresponding to the consequent. 
   The example in 6 can be explained along the same lines. 
   (23) Even if you drink just a little, your boss will fire you. 
           propositional form: p  -> q
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          constraint imposed byeven:  x  q A  x p PVA: 
 r  q  (24) 
 p  q,  r  q 
   (24) If you drink a lot, your boss will fire you. 
   Notice that the two types differentiated according to whether they 
have CI or not are not constant: They just happen to be as they are 
and have nothing to do with distinctions, ay, between the predicates. 
Therefore, we can expect, and indeed have an example with a dependent 
consequent using the same predicate as is adopted in 1, which shows CI. 
   (25) If it doesn't rain,  the game will continue; even if it rains lightly, 
       the  game will continue; but if it rains heavily, the game will 
       be  cancelled.') 
6. Consequence of the theory 
   As considered above, CI is caused through the interaction of the 
propositional form of the utterance with other information in the con-
text, so that it is simply a consequence of human logical operations. If 
this approach is correct, a usual conditional without even may often 
show CI, depending on assumptions in the  central, systems. One case of 
this is where  `-p q' is retrievable. Consider: 
   (26) Brigitte Bardot is strikingly beautiful, but if she were an ugly 
       witch, I would love her. 
26 is supposed to be able to have a concessive r ading. In this reading, 
the first conjunct  (`Brigitte Bardot is strikingly beautiful') activates an 
assumption  'If she is beautiful, I will love her.' and the latter conjunct 
 (If she were an ugly witch, I would love her') has a concessive r lation-
ship with the former assumption. Furthermore, if H regards  'She is 
beautiful.' and  'She is ugly.' as contradictory, the assumption that S will 
love her is derived. 
   The above interpretation, however, is not forced, because of the 
lack of even, and so 26 may alternatively be interpreted as a usual condi-
tional. In this case, the utterance also causes aconversational implicature 
such as 27 suggested by the use of the subjunctive mood. That is, the
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assumptions expressed as the consequent and  the' antecedent of the 
 implicature are regarded as true in the actual world. 
   (27) Since she is not an ugly witch, I will not love her. 
Notice that in the concessive case of  CI, the implicature in 27 can not be 
obtained. This is because, if it could be, the derived assumption that S 
will love her contradicts he consequent of 27.
7. Conclusion 
   Given our theory, it is not the case that in even if conditionals, 
even contributes to the truth-conditions while in usual utterances it does 
not. And neither the scope nor the focus varies according to the context. 
Nor are there two truth-conditions sensitive to whether the utterance 
has CI or not. (If so, the theory would have to include a  system  tomake 
a context to choose the reading.) In our theory, the context can be 
affected, and the phenomenon i question is just a consequence of the 
interaction between the meaning of a usual conditional and the normal 
function of even, so that CI may occur as a byproduct. That is, CI is 
not essential to this construction. This perspective accepts the dependent 
examples as well. Moreover, the phenomenon can be explained under 
the  assumption that even always  'performs the same function with the 
same scope and focus.
NOTES
* This is a shortened version of a paper I read at the Eighth National Conference 
 of the English Linguistic Society of Japan held at Rikkyo University on No-
  vember 17, 1990. I am grateful to Seisaku Kawakami, Daisuke Umehara, and 
  Michael T. Wescoat for their helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks again 
  go to Michael T. Wescoat, who kindly suggested stylistic improvements. All 
  remaining errors are mine.
1) It may not be appropriate to use such an intuitive term as  independent  ',
  for no relationship between  the antecedents and the consequents of  condi-
  tionals is assumed in the perspective we take in which conditionals in general
124 Even If Conditionals 
    are analyzed as material implications. 
      We, however, use  this,term mainly for two reasons: 1) We can grasp the 
   phenomenon in question easily. 2) We aim to show that the intuition can 
   be ascribed to the interactions in the human cognition assumed in Relevance 
   Theory: As is shown below, the consequents are  independent,  if the informa-
   tion corresponding to them is derived through logical operations. 
 2) That is, the truth-tables for usual conditionals and even if  conditionals would 
   be as follows: 
        p q If p, q. q even if p. 
  t t t t 
  t f f f
  f t t t
  f f t f
  This approach is practically the same as the one that treats even if as an idiom. 
   Since these truth-conditions  are the same as that of  q  ', this approachcannot 
 deal with the case where and even if conditional co-exists with -q 
3) As for this point  of view, see Blakemore 1987. 
4) In this case, however, the utterances will be judged inappropriate. Note that 
  if our  approach  is correct, this notion can be analyzed as describing the case 
   where H fails to recover contexts which are relevant enough. 
5) Here we neglect the cases of meta-linguistic negation. See Kay  1990. 
6) The antecedent may be  I behaved in a libertine manner'. The point is that 
   the value is not  '  -p 
7) The lack of CI in 25 may seem paradoxical in comparison to 1. However, the 
  introduction of scalarness with lightly brings with it a crucial difference in 
   the interpretation process which we do not have space to describe.
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